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I. THE CONTEXT
The Patent Clause of the Constitution of the United States grants Congress

the power to afford to inventors a limited monopoly over their discoveries.1
Congress acted on this authority by promulgating the Patent Act, codified in
Title thirty-five of the United States Code.2 The patent grant presently confers
upon the owner the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention in the United States for a period of seventeen years. 3

IU.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 8 states, in part, that "[t]he Congress shall have power..
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]" For a discussion of this clause as part of the constitutional scheme see
Karl Fenning, The Originof the Patent and CopyrightClause, 11 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 438 (1929).
235 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
335 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) provides, in part, that "[elvery patent shall contain ... a grant
to the patentee.... for the term of seventeen years.... the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States ... "See generally
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The quid pro quo for the rights obtained under a patent is that the applicant
must disclose to the public the best mode of reproducing the invention and in
terms that will enable one skilled in the particular field to make and use the
same discovery.4 For the patent to issue, the invention must be of a patentable
subject matter 5 and satisfy the statutory requirements of novelty,6 utility,7 and
nonobviousness. 8 The applicant must sufficiently demonstrate that each of
these elements is present in the patent application. 9 Ultimately, the Patent
Office10 Examiner will render the patentability determination by way of an ex

Donald Y. Turner, The PatentSystem and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1969)

(discussing the social and economic bases of the patent system).

A patent typically sets forth a number of distinct claims that describe the invention.
Claims identify the bounds of the technical area within which the patent owner has the
exclusive rights. The claims are akin to the metes and bounds of a deed of real property,
defining the precise dimensions of ownership in the property. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 40 (1991). See generally 2
PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §§ 14.01-14.11 (1991 rev.). Patents,

however, have the attributes of personal property and, thus, may be assigned or licensed
to others. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
435 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). See generally ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL
CIRCuIT§ 5.3 (2d ed. 1991).
5

See, e.g., Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524,1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating mere ideas are
nonpatentable subject matter); RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d
1440, 1445 n. 5 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (positing abstractions or concepts are not capable of
receiving patent protection). See generally 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 10.04 (1990
rev.).

635 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1988). An invention is novel (or not anticipated) when no
prior art reference contains every element of the claimed invention. See Lewmar Marine,
Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744,74748 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See generallyHARMON, supra note
4, at § 3.2.
735 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The utility requirement is satisfied when an operable
invention is capable of use and performs some societal function that is not clearly illegal.
Anderson v. Natta, 480 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1973). See generally I CHISUM, supra
note 5, at § 4.01; 2 ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at §§ 8.00-8.06.
835 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). The standard of nonobviousness as set forth by the Supreme
Court requires a fourstep factual inquiry: (1) determining the scope and content of the
prior art; (2) examining the difference between the invention and the prior art; (3)
determining the level of ordinary skill in -the art at the time of the invention; and (4)
considering the objective evidence of so-called secondary considerations, including
commercial success, unexpected results, and long felt need. Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966); see also Vandenberg v. Dairy Equipment Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1984). Upon compiling this information, it must be determined whether the
discovery would have been obvious to the hypothetical person in the art with ordinary
skill. See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 5, at §§ 5.035.05; 2 ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at
§§ 9.009.05.
9

See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).

10

The Patent Office is a division of the Patent and Trademark Office, an
administrative agency within the Department of Commerce. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The
head agency official is the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks [hereinafter

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss2/7

2

1993]

STAYING PATENT VALIDITY LITIGATION

parte examination, 1 performed in confidence with the participation of the
applicant.1 2 The examiner will compare the claimed invention to the prior art
in order to ascertain whether the criteria have been satisfied so as to allow the
13
issuance of a patent.
If the applicant satisfies the statutory requirements for invention, the
applicant will be awarded a patent. 14 Thereafter, the validity of the patent may
be brought into question based on alleged infirmities associated with the initial
Patent Office examination. 15 The Patent Act of 1980,16 effective July 1, 1981,
introduced an administrative patent reexamination procedure designed to
resolve certain patent validity questions. 17 According to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter Federal Circuit), 18

Commissioner] who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a) (1988).
1135 U.S.C. § 131 (1988). An examiner is a Patent Office employee of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability to undertake the task of passing upon applications for
patents. 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.101(a) (1992). See generally HARMON, supra
note 4, at § 13.1.
1235 U.S.C. § 122 (1988).
13Prior art is the available corpus of technological information that can be drawn
upon by an inventor at any one time. The process of obtaining the grant of a patent,
which involves periodic correspondence between the Patent Office and the applicant or
his or her agent, is known as patent prosecution. See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 5, at
§ 5.03; HARMON, supranote 4, at § 13.1; 2 ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at §§ 15.00-15.11.
1435 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
15 See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
16 Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015
(1980) (codified as amended as Prior Art Citations to Office and Reexamination of
Patents at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988)). See generally Kenneth R. Adamo, Patent
Reexamination, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (1982).

17See generally H.R. REP. No. 96-1307 Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6463 [hereinafter House Report].
18 The Federal Circuit has had considerable influence on the growth and vitality of
reexamination as an element of our patent system. Created by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act, it is a specialized court formed by combining the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and the U.S. Court of Claims. See Federal Court
Improvement Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (relevant
provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988)) [hereinafter
FCIA]. Its charter, effective October 1, 1982, granted the court exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all claims involved in patent infringement suits which arise in the
districts across the nation and over patent application proceedings and interference
proceedings which come before the Board of PatentAppeals and Interferences. 35 U.S.C.
§ 1295 (1988). The proponents of the FCIA legislation hoped that a single appellate
forum would create predictability and uniformity in the patent laws, which would
effectively eliminate forum shopping and foster technological growth and innovation.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) (reviewing the successes and failures of the Federal Circuit as
a specialized tribunal and suggesting how the court can more coherently fit into the
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The [reexamination] bill's proponents foresaw three principal benefits.
First, the new procedure could settle validity disputes more quickly
.and less expensively than the often protracted litigation involved in
such cases. Second, the procedures would allow courts to refer patent
validity matters to the expertise of the Patent Office. . . . Third,
reexamination would reinforce "inventor confidence in the certainty of
patent rights" by affording the PTO a broader opportunity to review
"doubtful patents"....19
The so-called "reexamination procedure" thus permits the Patent Office to
have
reconsider certain matters affecting the validity of the patent which may
20
escaped review during the course of examining the initial application.
Reexamination of a patent may occur in two principal scenarios. In one
context, the patent owner, concerned with the integrity of the initial
examination, independently pursues reexamination in order to remove any
doubt associated with the validity of issued patent claims. Another more
common context, on which this Note will focus, occurs when reexamination is
sought during litigation in which the validity of a patent is called into question.
In either situation, the Patent Office will reach a decision in the reexamination
that reaffirms, disaffirms, or revises its earlier conclusions as to patentability.
Litigation involving the validity of an issued patent occurs exclusively in
federal court.21 Validity can be called into question either in a suit for infringe-

judicial system); see also Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent
System, 73J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 5,13 (1991) ("as a result of profound changes
in public policy, legislation and judicial decisions, [the patent system] has been
transformed from a weak incentive to invent into a powerful weapon for protecting
inventions"); see generally 2 HARMON, supra note 4, at §§ 14.1-15.2.
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594,602 (Fed. Cir. 1985), modified, reh'g denied,
771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (quoting 126 Cong. Rec. 29,895 (1980)
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
19

204 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPScoMB III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15.2 (3d ed.

1986). Another procedure that is broader in scope - known as "reissue" - is available as
an alternative to reexamination. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988). It involves, essentially, a
reprosecution of all of the claims of a patent. A reissue may be sought by a patent owner
because the original claims are (1) too narrow and do not adequately protect the true
scope of the invention; or (2) too broad and are invalid as claiming some aspects of prior
art not invented by the patentee. HARMON, supra note 4, at § 13.3.
2128 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss2/7
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ment 22 or an action for a declaratory judgment. 23 The issue generally arises by
way of a challenge that, in view of newly discovered evidence, the statutory

requirements of patentability i.e., novelty, utility and nonobviousness, were not
satisfied. 24 The party challenging the validity of the patent has the burden of

overcoming the presumption of validity that attaches to each patent claim 25 by
clear and convincing evidence. 26 If the challenger fails to meet its burden, the
patent does not thereby become valid. Rather, validity is sustained unless and

until another challenger can overcome the rebuttable presumption. 27

Reexamination serves to benefit a court by relieving it of the need to litigate
certain difficult questions of patentability without first obtaining an opinion

2235 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988) provides, in part, that "whoever without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent." The remedies available to a patent owner whose
rights have been infringed include damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. 35
U.S.C. §§ 283-85 (1988). See generally 5 CHIsUM, supra note 5, at §§ 20.03-.04.
An accused infringer may, however, have an affirmative defense. 35 U.S.C. § 282
(1988) states that "[tihe following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity
or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringement, absence of
liability for infringement or unenforceability, (2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in
suit on any ground specfied .. .as a condition for patentability." (emphasis added). See
generally HARMON, supra note 4, at §§ 6.1-6.5. See also Ronald D. Hatman, Patent
Infringement, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 454 (1990).
23

The declaratory judgment remedy may allow an accused infringer to preempt an
infringement suit commenced by the patent owner. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988) provides, in
part, that "[iun a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the
United States ...may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration..." The standard used in determining whether an actual case
or controversy exists in a declara toryjudgment action involving pa tents is two-pronged.
"First, the defendant's conduct must have created on the part of the plaintiff a reasonable
apprehension that the defendant will initiate suit if the plaintiff continues the allegedly
infringing activity. Second, the plaintiff must actually have either produced the device
or have prepared to produce that device." Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Releasomers, 824
F.2d 953,955 (Fed. Cir. 1987). For a discussion of the framework and inherent limitations
of reexamination that the patent challenger must face see William J. Sperenza & Michael
L. Goldman, Reexamination -The Patent Challenger'sView, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 85 (1987).
24

See supranotes 6-8 and accompanying text.
2535 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). The presumption of validity is premised upon the
acknowledged expertise of the Patent Office in deciding questions of patentability.
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 530 F. Supp. 303, 310 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see also
infra part IV, A; see generally HARMON, supra note 4, at § 1.5 (presumption of validity is
a rule of procedure which places the burden of persuasion on him who attacks a patent's
validity)..
26

E.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. 802 F.2d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
27
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("It is
neither necessary nor appropriate for a court to declare a patent valid. A trial court is
required by Congress ....to say only whether the patent challenger carried its burden
of establishing invalidity in the particularcase before the court.... (emphasis supplied)),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
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from the Patent Office. 2 8 Along with this feature, the legislative history of the
statute identifies fairness and efficiency as objectives that may be achieved
through the reexamination procedure:
The cost incurred in defensive patent litigation sometimes reaches
$250,000 for each party, an impossible burden for many smaller firms.
The result is a chilling effect on those businesses and independent
investors who have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to
successfully innovate and develop new products. A new patent
reexamination procedure is needed to permit the owner of a patent to
have the validity of his patent tested in the Patent Office where the
most expert opinions exist at a much reduced cost. Patent Office
reexamination will greatly reduce, if not end, the threat of legal costs
being used to "blackmail" such holders into allowing patent
29
infringements or being forced to license their patents at nominal fees.
Although the merits of reexamination are legion, 3 0 Congress expressly chose
not to include a provision that would require district courts to stay litigation
involving patent validity pending the outcome of the reexamination
proceeding. 3 1 Congress believed that courts, which possess the inherent power
to stay their proceedings, 32 are better positioned to make such a decision on a
basis by reference to the particular facts and circumstances
case-by-case
33
present.
This note will discuss the circumstances under which it is appropriate for a
court to exercise its authority to stay patent validity litigation pending
reexamination of the patent-in-suit. 34 The question must be analyzed with due
regard to the unique relationship that exists between Patent Office
reexamination and district court litigation. As a point of departure, the note
explains the substance and procedure of statutory reexamination. Secondly, it
will discuss the possible effects that reexamination may have on concurrent
litigation in a district court. Thirdly, the note will examine the discernible
factors that courts have considered in deciding whether to suspend litigation
pending a result from reexamination. Fourthly, it will offer guidelines as to how
28

HARMON, supra note 4, at § 5.3.

29

House Report, supra note 17, at 6463. For a discussion of the factors an accused
infringer should consider in deciding whether or not to take a license under the patent
see Steven Z. Szczepanski, Licensing or Settlement: Deferring the Fight to Another Day, 15

AIPLA Q.J. 298 (1987).
30

See infra note 165.

31

See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.

32

See infra text accompanying notes 94-95.

33

See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

34
This note supersedes Robert W. Fieseler, Staying Litigation Pending Reexamination
of Patents, 14 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 279 (1983) which surveyed the theme shortly after the

reexamination statute was enacted.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss2/7
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a court will likely dispose of the issue in view of the interests and policies
involved; and, in addition, it will offer an omnibus standard for deciding the
question, which is formulated consistent with precedent. Lastly, the note
recapitulates the context in which the subject issue arises and identifies the
over-arching policy considerations that are implicated in the decision-making
process.
II. THE PROCESS OF REEXAMINATION
The substance and procedure of reexamination is provided for in the Patent
Act,35 the U.S. Code of Regulations 36 and the Patent Office procedures. 37 A
general overview of the reexamination framework provides instructive
guidance. 38
A. Request for Reexamination
Any person has standing to file a request for the reexamination of any patent
claim issued by the Patent Office. 39 The request may be made on the basis of
prior art, in the form of patents or printed publications, 40 that the party making

3535 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (1988). The reexamination statute withstood constitutional
scrutiny in Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599-605 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (due

process and right to trial by jury not offended), modified, reh'g denied, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
3637 C.F.R. §§ 1.501-1.570 (1992).
37

Patent Office examiners rely on UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE §§ 2201-2294 (Rev. 12, July 1989)
[hereinafter cited as MPEPI as a detailed source from which to conduct the
reexamination proceeding. Although the MPEP does not have the force of law, the
procedures that it describes can be relied upon by the public. In re Kaghan, 387 F.2d 398,

401 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
38

See generally 3 CHISUM, supra note 5, at § 11.07141 (provides a thorough
consideration of the policies and procedures of reexamination). See also Kenneth R.
Conger, Patent Reexamination Reexamined, 1986 DET. C.L. REV. 523 (1986); Adamo, supra
note 16.
3935 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(a) (1992); MPEP, supra note 37, § 2212
(stating that there are no persons who are excluded from being able to seek
reexamination; and corporations and/or governmental entities are included within the
scope of the clause "any person").
4035 U.S.C. § 301 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.501 (a) (1992). Although important matters of
patentability are considered under this limited scope of reexamination, other issues,
including inequitable conduct, statutory bar, disclosure inadequacy or fraud on the
PTO, must be resolved by way of litigation in the district courts. See Gregory N. Neff,
Patent Reexamination-Valuable, But Flawed: Recommendations for Change, 68 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 575 (1986) (arguing that the scope of reexamination should not

be expanded to include other issues due to the added cost and the fact that the district
courts are institutionally better situated to address the other issues).
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the request believes to have a bearing upon the patentability of the claim. 41
Reexamination may be requested during the period of enforceability of a
patent, which is normally seventeen years from the issue date.4 2
In most cases, the requester will be either the patent owner or one who is
challenging the validity of the patent.43 The goal of the former consists of
removing any infirmities associated with the patent as issued. On the other
hand, the objective of the latter, possibly a licensee of the patent or possible
infringer, consists of testing the validity of the patent through reexamination
before having to litigate the issue.
A reexamination fee must accompany the request for reexamination. 44
Moreover, the request must set forth the pertinency of the prior art and
publications, and identify the manner by which the cited material should be
applied to the respective claims for which reexamination is requested. 45 When
the reexamination requester is not the patent owner, the Patent Office will send
a copy of the request for reexamination to the patent owner.46

4135 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(a) (1992). 35 U.S.C. § 302 provides, in part,
that:
Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the
Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited
under the provisions of section 301 of this title. The request must be in
writing and must be accompanied by payment of a reexamination fee.
. .. The request must set forth the pertinency and manner applying cited
prior art to every claim for which reexamination is requested.
The cited prior art patents or printed publications upon which such a request is based
usually consists of those which were not considered by the patent examiner during the
processing of the patent application which resulted in the patent-in-suit. Ingro v. Tyco
Indus., Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. 69, 70 (N.D. 111. 1985).
4235 U.S.C. § 154 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(a) (1992).
43

For purposes of this note, the latter situation is the paradigm, and the discussion
infra generally presumes that the petition has been filed by this party.
4435 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(a) (1992). The examination fee is presently
$2180.37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c) (1992).
4535 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(2) (1992).
4635 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(5) (1992). Note that the patent owner is
barred from issuing statements or other responses prior to the order on the request. 37
C.F.R.§ 1.530(a) (1991). A due process challenge to this provision was avoided for lack
of a justiciable controversy in Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 607 (Fed Cir.
1985), modified, rch'g denied, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss2/7
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B. Determinationof SubstantialNew Question of Patentabilityand the
Reexamination Order
Within three months of the filing of the reexamination petition, the
Commissioner will determine whether the request raises a "substantial new
question of patentability"4 7 affecting any claim of the patent.4 8 The
49
Commissioner may also make the same determination sua sponte.

In the usual case, a Patent Office examiner will determine if a substantial

new question of patentability exists by comparing the prior art of record in the
original patent application with the prior art cited in the request for

reexamination. 50 If the prior art patents and printed publications are material 51
to the reexamination of at least one claim of the patent, then a substantial new
52
question of patentability exists.

The Commissioner will issue an order either granting or denying
reexamination based upon its determination. 53 An order granting
reexamination is merely a statement that a substantial question exists as to the
patentability of certain claims; this determination, thus, has no bearing on the
merits of an invalidity challenge. 54 As such, the patent remains valid and may

be enforced during the period of reexamination. 55 On the other hand, if the
47

The requirement that a substantial new question of patentability be raised by the
request protects patent owners from having to respond to or participate in unjustified
reexaminations. Kaufman Co., Inc. v. Lantech Inc, 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
4835 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a) (1992). The Patent Office, in making
this determination, is not limited to considering the prior art and publications cited in
the reexamination request; it may also consider additional patents and printed
publications in making this decision. 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a) (1992). This material would
include the prior art of record in the parent or any earlier reexamination file. MPEP,
supra note 37, at § 2242. This expansive scope of prior art from which reexamination
may be conducted has raised some concem with regard to the intrusiveness of the
procedure. For example, in In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
852 (1985), it was noted that this broad scope of what prior art may be considered, absent
a presumption of validity during reexamination, too easily allows the Patent Office to
second guess its original patentability determination. Id. at 864 (Nies, J., concurring).
4935 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (1992).
50In re Peame, 212 U.S.P.Q. 466, 468 (Comr Pats 1981).
51
MPEP, supra note 37, at § 2242 states, in part, that "[a] prior art patent or printed
publication is material to the examination of a claim of the patent where there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the prior art patent or
publication important in deciding whether or not the claim is patentable."
52

1d. An exception to this rule occurs when "it is clear to the examiner that the same
question of patentability has already been decided (1) by a final holding of invalidity
by a federal court or (2) by the [Patent Office] either in the original examination, the
examination of a reissue patent, or an earlier concluded reexamination." Id.
5335 U.S.C. § 304 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.525(a) (1992).
54

MPEP, supra note 37, at § 2240.

55See Ethicon Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428-29 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Commissioner decides not to institute a reexamination proceeding, the
decision is final and nonappealable.56 In that event, the Patent Office will grant
57
a partial refund to the requester of the proceeding.
C. Reexamination Proceedings
If the Commissioner issues a reexamination order, the patent owner has two
months within which to file a statement of position on any substantially new
issue of patentability raised.58 The requester is thereafter given two months to
submit a reply to the patent owner's statement.5 9 After filing this reply, the
Patent Office deems the requester no longer involved in the proceedings and,
hence, he or she may not correspond further with the examiner.60
The patent claims are, subsequently, reexamined in an ex parte fashion,
according to the general rules governing examination of applications for a

5635 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(c) (1992). Cf. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852,859
n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Absent a 'substantial new question', an alleged infringer cannot
'force' a patentee back into the PTO"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985).
5735 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(b) (1992). The refund amount is presently
$1635.37. C.F.R. § 1.26(c) (1992).
58
The statement may also include a proposal to amend any claim or claims. 35 U.S.C.
§ 304 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(b) (1992).
5935 U.S.C. § 304 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.535 (1992).
6035 U.S.C. § 305 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(e) (1991). The Federal Circuit has, thus,
held that a third party requester has no right to intervene in an appeal by the patent
owner from an adverse reexamination ruling. In re Opprecht, 868 F.2d 1264,1265 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) ("The legislative intent was to provide specified limits to the participation of
third parties, thus adding weight to the purpose of facilitating and expediting the
reexamination proceeding, as against the possible advantages of full inter partes
contests"); see also Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 882 F.2d 1570,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (third party requester lacks standing to challenge a reexamination
proceeding). Such limited participation in the reexamination procedure has been
criticized by some commentators. David A. Lowin, Comment: Reexamination "Catch 22 ",
15 AIPLA Q.J. 218 (arguing that reexamination rules are too inflexible and should be
changed to allow participation of non-owner requesters to the extent of making
supplemental comments, providing additional status information, and appealing
reexamination); Neff, supra note 40 (arguing that the reexamination statute should be
amended to grant to all requesters an equal right to participation and appeal); cf. 3
CHISUM, supra note 5, § 11.07[4][d] ("It would seem appropriate to allow continued
participation of a nature comparable to that now afforded to a protesting party under
[37 C.F.R. § 1.291]").
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patent.6 1 As such, the patent owner may add claims to the patent, amend claims
to distinguish them from the prior art,62 and conduct examiner interviews. 63
The patent owner is under a duty of candor and good faith during
reexamination. 64 This obligation requires the patent owner to disclose all
patents or printed publications, not previously of record, that are material to

the reexamination. 65 Moreover, reexamination proceedings, including any
appeals to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board of Appeals),
must be conducted by the Patent Office with "special dispatch."66
During the reexamination proceeding the presumption of validity afforded
patent claims during litigation6 7 does not apply.68 The Federal Circuit
concluded that its application is incompatible with reexamination because the
presumption is predicated on the notion of administrative correctness, an
assumption that is fundamentally at odds with the underlying theory behind
reexamination. 69 The standard of proof thus required to reject patent claims in
a reexamination proceeding is not clear and convincing but only a
preponderance of evidence. Moreover, because the patent owner may amend
his claims during prosecution to obtain protection commensurate with his
actual contribution to the art, the claims will be given their broadest reasonable

6137 C.F.R. §§ 1.550(a), 1.104-1.119 (1992); see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) ("the intent underlying reexamination is to 'start over' in the PTO with respect
to the limited examination areas involved ... "(emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 828 (1985).
62

Note that a proposed amendment or new claim which would have the effect of
enlarging the scope of a claim of the patent is prohibited in reexamination. 35 U.S.C.
§ 305 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.530(a), 1.552(b) (1992).
6335 U.S.C. § 305 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.530, 1.560 (1992).
6437 C.F.R. § 1.555(a) (1992).
651d.
66305 U.S.C. § 305 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(a) (1992). The Federal Circuit has held that
this requirement bars the Patent Office from staying the reexamination proceeding
pending the outcome of litigation involving an issue of validity of the same patent.
Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
67

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

68

1n re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985). This
rule has been the subject of criticism beca use of the systemic problems that it effects. See,
e.g., In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 860-62 (Nies,J., concurring) (arguing that rule will likely chill
voluntary use of procedure by patent owner and allow challenger to circumvent the
more difficult burden it has in litigation); Edmund J. Fish, Examining the Federal Circuit's
Positionon the Presumptionof Validity DuringPatentReexamination, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1405
(1986) (arguing that rule is not supported by legislative history and offends due process).
69

Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594,605 (Fed. Cir. 1985), modified, reh'g denied,
771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Patlex court also held that the failure to apply the
presumption of validity in reexamination does not effect a Fifth Amendment taking. 758
F.2d at 605.
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interpretation consistent with the specification. 70 These principles are a
reflection of the policy that reexamination is a neutral proceeding with the
patentee and the public having an equal interest in the issuance and
71
maintenance of valid and reliable patents.

If the patent owner is subjected to an adverse ruling by the examiner with
respect to the patentability of any claim, the patent owner may appeal to the
Board of Appeals.72 The patent owner, additionally, may seek review of a
negative Board of Appeals' decision via appeal to the Federal Circuit or by
filing a civil action to obtain a patent in the U.S. District Court for the District

of Columbia. 73 Upon conclusion of the reexamination proceeding and any
appeals, the Commissioner will issue a certificate canceling any claim
determined to be unpatentable, confirming any claim determined to be

patentable, and incorporating into the patent any new claims or amendments
determined to be patentable. 74
III. THE IMPACT OF REEXAMINATION ON LITIGATION
A decision by the Patent Office that the reexamined claims of an issued patent
are canceled as unpatentable renders the claims unenforceable in the pending
litigation and in any future disputes. 75 Cancellation through reexamination,

however, is available only when the claims at issue are unpatentable over prior
art patents and publications. 76 As such, other issues which may adversely affect

70
1n re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569,1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing rule of narrow
claim interpretation in infringement suits wherein claims cannot be amended). The
effect of this principle is that it is more likely that the PTO will hold claims to be
unpatentable in view of the asserted prior art. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 5, at § 11.03.
Thus, this doctrine, coupled with the fact that the presumption of validity does not apply
in reexamination, provides an obvious incentive to the patent challenger to pursue
reexamination in lieu of litigating the matter in district court. See generally In re Etter,
756 F.2d 852, 86062 (Fed Cir. 1985) (Nies, J., concurring), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828(1985);
see also Sperenza, supra note 23.
71

In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985).

7235 U.S.C. § 306 (1988).
73Id.
7435 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.570 (1992). Note that under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 307(b), 252, the doctrine of intervening rights may provide an affirmative defense to
otherwise infringing activity if the activity or preparation for it was started before the
grant of new claims. See, e.g., Kaufman Co. v. Lantech Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 978 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
75

See Output Technology Corp. v. Dataproducts Corp., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072, 1073
(W.D. Wash. 1991); Cf.3 CHISUM, supranote 5, at § 11.07[4][f] ("reexamination introduces
... a procedure for involuntary cancellation of a patent by the [Patent] Office after
issuance.")
7635 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.552(c) (1992). See also supra notes 40-41
and accompanying text.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss2/7

12

1993]

STAYING PATENT VALIDITY LITIGATION

patent validity, such as public use or sale, indefiniteness, and priority of
invention, must be addressed in litigation. 77
Patent claims that survive reexamination intact remain, nonetheless, subject

to the same validity attacks during litigation as those asserted during
reexamination. 78 The Patent Office determination, thus, does not have a

preclusive effect against third parties, such as the third-party requester, whose
petition for reexamination was unsuccessful. 79 One reason is that, although
there is a connection between the reexamination proceeding and the litigation,

the former is not resjudicatavis-a-vis the latter because they do not involve, per
se, the same cause of action.80 Furthermore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
is not applicable during litigation because the nature of the reexamination
proceeding does not afford the third-party requester an adequate opportunity
to litigate its claim.8 1 Finally, as the Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated, the
reexamination and litigation are distinct proceedings that involve differing
evidentiary standards that may lead to different results. 82
Although not binding, a decision by the Patent Office upholding the validity
of reexamined patent claims is strong evidence that a district court must

consider in assessing whether the party asserting invalidity has met its burden
of clear and convincing evidence. 83 And, by virtue of a decision sustaining the
validity of the claims, this burden becomes more difficult to satisfy.84

77

See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422,1428-29 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

78

d.; In re Certain Stabilizing Hull Units and Components, 218 U.S.P.Q.2d 752 (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982). Note, however, that parties to litigation may voluntarily
agree to be bound by the decision of the Patent Office. See, e.g., GPAC, Inc. v. D.W.W.
Enter. Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1129, 1130-34 (D. N.J. 1992).
793 CHISUM, supra note 5, at § 11.07[41[f].
See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Nies, J., concurring).

80
81

1n PIC Inc. v. Prescon Corp., 485 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Del. 1980), the court addressed
the issue of the effect on litigation of a reissue determination favorable to the patentee.
The court held that the reissue determination did not preclude litigation on the validity
issue because (1) the reissue proceeding is essentially ex parte; (2) third parties have no
opportunity for discovery or crossexamination; and (3) third parties have no right to
appeal an adverse decision. Id. at 1309-11; see also PPG Indus. v. Celanese Polymer
Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988); cf. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (collateral estoppel applies against
a patentee on the issue of validity when there has been a fair opportunity to litigate the
claim). This reasoning would apply with equal force in the reexamination context. See
3 CHISUM, supra note 5, at § 11.07[4][f].
82
See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422,1428-29 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (considering
different evidence and different standards of proof on invalidity).
83

Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffery-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also Kaufman Co., Inc. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See
generally 3 CHISUM, supra note 5, at § 11.0714].
84 Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffery-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961 (Fed Cir.

1986).
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The reexamination result may thus impact litigation in several distinct ways.
First, if the Patent Office declares the patent claims invalid because they are
unpatentable in view of the newly discovered prior art, the owner of the patent
cannot enforce them against the accused infringer.85 Second, if the claims
emerge from reexamination intact and effectively strengthened as a result of
the scrutiny of the Patent Office, trial issues will be simplified and settlement
will be encouraged. 86 Third, if the claims are narrowed to some extent, the
Patent Office opinion will, nonetheless, provide valuable guidance that may
87
facilitate the trial on the merits.
IV. THE FACTORS CONSIDERED INDECIDING WHETHER TO STAY THE LITIGATION
PENDING THE OUTCOME OF REEXAMINATION
It is an undisputed fact that reexamination can provide the district courts
with valuable guidance on technical questions of patent validity. Indeed, in
Gould v. Control Laser Corp.,88 the Federal Circuit recognized that when a court
issues an order staying its proceedings pending reexamination, 89 it does not
terminate the action but rather shifts the claim validity issue in the dispute to
the experts in the Patent Office. 9° The court, noting the merits of this
mechanism, stated: "[o]ne purpose of the reexamination procedure is to
eliminate the trial of that issue (when the claim is canceled) or to facilitate trial
of that issue by providing the district court with the expert view of the [Patent
Office] (when a claim survives the proceeding)." 91 In the absence of an ability
to suspend the litigation in anticipation of the Patent Office opinion, this
92
objective cannot be realized.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the basis of a court's authority
to stay its proceedings in Landis v. North American Co. 93 Speaking through
Justice Cardozo, the Court explained:

85 See, e.g., Grayling Indus. v. GPAC Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872, 1874 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
86

See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffery-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
87
See, e.g., GPAC, Inc. v. D.W.W. Enter. Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q. 1129,1131-32 (D. N.J. 1992).
88 705 F.2d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983).
89

1t is worthy of note that one court held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which requires a court to submit certain questions to the administrative agency with
special competence over the matter, was inapplicable when the question is one of patent
validity. RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 467 F. Supp. 99, 104 (D. Del. 1979)
(holding doctrine inappropriate because question is not one of regulatory policy or of
economic conditions).
90 Gould, 705 F.2d at 1342.
91

1d.

93299 U.S. 248 (1936).
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The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of the actions on its docket with
economy and effort for itself, for counsel and for litigants. How this
can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which
must weigh
94
competing interests and maintain an even balance.
This same authority exists to allow a court to order a stay of patent validity
litigation pending the conclusion of a Patent Office reexamination. 95
In determining the desirability of such a stay, the district court has
considerable latitude.96 As a practical matter, the court will use a balancing test
and, thus, weigh the competing interests put forth by the parties in order to
arrive at an equitable solution.97 The appeals court will uphold its disposition
unless an abuse of discretion would otherwise result. 98
During the course of a stay, the court quite obviously retains jurisdiction to
respond to changing factual circumstances with appropriate orders. Thus, if a
stay is granted prior to the decision from the Patent Office as to whether a

94

1d. at 254.

95

Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422,142627 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (courts "have inherent
power to manage their dockets and stay proceedings, including the authority to order
a stay pending conclusion of a PTO reexamination."); accord Gould v. Control Laser
Corp., 705 F.2d 1340,1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983); seealsoGPAC
Inc. v. D.W.W. Enter. Inc. 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1129,1131 (D. N.J. 1992).
By contrast, the Ethicon court held that reexamination by the Patent Office should
not be stayed pending litigation in court because of the distinct nature of the proceeding
in each forum and the statutory duty imposed on the Office to proceed with special
dispatch. Ethicon Inc., 849 F.2d at 1428-29; see also Wayne Automation Corp. v. R. A.
Pearson Co., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718, 1720 (E.D. Wash. 1991) ("[I]t would be entirely
reasonable that the two forums might reach opposite conclusions regarding a patent's
validity because (1) the forums take different approaches in determining invalidity and
on the same evidence could quite correctly come to different conclusions, (2) a court's
decision is likely to be based on a more complete record, (3) district court litigation may
include challenges to validity which the PTO cannot consider, and (4) the two forums
have different standards of proof for determining invalidity").
96

Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 935 (1983);seealsoEmhartIndus. Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd.,3 U.S.P.Q.2d
1889, 1890 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
97
See, e.g., Output Technology Corp. v. Dataproducts Corp., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072,1074
(W.D. Wash. 1991); United Sweetner USA, Inc. v. Nutrasweet Co., 766 F. Supp. 212,217
(D. Del. 1991).
98
Gould, 705 F.2d at 1341. In Gould, the patentee appealed the district court's order
staying the proceedings pending reexamination. The Federal Circuit dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the district court decision was not a
final appealable order that would render it subject to appeal. It held that an order staying
the litigation pending reexamination would be subject to appeal only when the stay is
for such a "protracted or indefinite period" so as to put the parties "effectively out of
court." Id. The court, however, did not outline the criteria by which it would determine
whether the order constitutes an abuse of discretion.
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substantial new question of patentability exists,9 9 the court can issue an order
lifting the stay upon a negative determination. 100 Similarly, the court may
dissolve the stay when preliminary reports from the Patent Office reveal that
some of the claims at issue will survive reexamination. 101 Or, if the
reexamination lasts for period of time that unduly prejudices one of the parties,
the court may lift the stay and proceed with the litigation. 102 Absent such
events, however, the suspension will endure for the period of reexamination. 103
As previously stated, the reexamination statute does not expressly provide
for a stay of litigation involving claim validity pending the outcome of a
reexamination proceeding. 104 Congress, however, deemed such a provision
unnecessary under the circumstances. 105 The House Report explains:
It is believed by the committee that stay provisions are unnecessary in
that such power already resides with the Court to prevent costly
pretrial maneuvering which attempts to circumvent the reexamination
procedure. It is anticipated that these measures provide a useful and
necessary alternativefor challengers and for patent owners to test the
States patents in an efficient and relatively
validity of United 106
manner.
inexpensive

99

See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.

10OGrayling Indus. v. GPAC Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872,1874 (N.D. Ga. 1991); Brown v.
Shimano American Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1496 (C.D. Cal. 1991). Compare this scenario
with one in which the court denies a stay prior to the Patent Office resolution of the
threshold question. In the latter, the court may reconsider the merits of the motion if
reexamination is ordered. See Output Technology Corp. v. Dataproducts Corp., 22
U.S.P.Q.2d 1072 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
10 1 Purolite Int'l, Ltd. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1857,1860 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
Rohm and Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1369,1372 (D. Del. 1992).
102 Purolite Int'l, Ltd. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1857,1859 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
cf. United Sweetener USA, Inc. v. Nutrasweet Co., 766 F. Supp. 212,218-19 (D. Del. 1991)
(holding stay dissolves upon ruling from Patent Board of Appeals on patent owner's
appeal from an adverse decision in order to avoid unfair tactical advantage to the patent
owner).
103

Purolite Int'l, Ltd. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1957,1859 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(imposing duty on party whose patent was being reexamined to inform court as to status
of reexamination); Grayling Indus. v. GPAC Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872, 1874 (N.D. Ga.
1991).
104 Note that early versions of what became the reexamination statute under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 301-07 (1988) expressly provided for a stay of court proceedings during
reexamination. See S. 1679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 310 (1979); H.R. 5075, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 310 (1979); S. 2446,96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 310 (1980).
10SEthicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
106 House Report, supra note 17, at 6463 (emphasis added).. See generally Gould v.
Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340,1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983).
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It is thus quite clear that Congress intended that district courts would liberally
grant stays pending reexamination. 107 Indeed, the Federal Circuit recognized
that "stay[s] must be accepted if the purpose of the reexamination statute is to
be preserved. " 108

Notwithstanding this preference for granting stays, the moving party does

not enjoy a stay pending reexamination as of right.109 Rather, the district court
will, in exercising its discretion, consider a number of factors in order to decide

the matter.110 Among these factors are: (1) the technical expertise of the Patent

Office; (2) the probable effect on the litigation that granting a stay would have;
(3) the stage of the litigation at which the motion was filed; and (4) the adequacy
of the patent owner's legal remedy. 1 "1Courts balance these factors, and if in
toto the benefits of granting the motion to stay litigation pending reexamination
outweigh the burdens associated with delay caused by the additional
112
proceeding, the motion will be granted.
The factors identified will be discussed separately in order to illustrate their
significance in particular factual settings. The discussion that follows will
attempt to synthesize the governing standard in a way that recognizes the
competing considerations that a court will attempt to best accommodate.

A. Expertiseof the Patent Office
Courts generally consider the expertise of the Patent Office, under which
claim validity will be evaluated, as an important factor in determining whether
to stay its proceedings.1 13 Because of its technical acumen and unique position
in the administrative scheme, the Patent Office is perceived as the institution

best able to assess the validity of a patent in view of the prior art.114 A court

107 GPAC Inc. v. D.W.W. Enter. Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1129,1131 (D. N.J. 1992) ("Congress
noted its approval of district courts liberally granting stays ....
");
Robert H. Harris Co.,
Inc. v. Metal Mfg. Co. Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786,1788 (E.D. Ark. 1991) ("legislative history
surrounding the establishment of the reexamination proceeding evinces congressional
approval of district courts liberally granting stays."); Ingro v. Tyco Indus., Inc., 227
U.S.P.Q 69,71 (N.D. 111. 1985) ("legislative history indicates Congress and the testifying
witnesses approved of courts liberally granting stays within their discretion").
108Gould, 705 F.2d at 1342.
109 Cf. Wayne Automation Corp. v. RA. Pearson Co., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718, 1720 (E.D.
Wash. 1991).
110

See, e.g., Emhart Indus. Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889 (N.D.
Ill. 1987).
111
This last factor, of course, is relevant only when a stay is sought by the patent
challenger.
1 12
See, e.g., GPAC Inc. v. D.W.W. Enter. Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1129, 1134 (D. N.J. 1992);
Brown v. Shimano Am. Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1496 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
113E.g., GPAC, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1132; see also Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d
1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983).
1 14

See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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may, however, choose to proceed with the litigation without the assistance of
the Patent Office when the reexamination involves an issue that is not highly
technical. 115 Furthermore, a court will be inclined to proceed toward trial when
it already has the benefit of a technical evaluation from the Patent Office, arising
116
out of a prior reexamination.
In Loffland Bros. Co. v. MidWestern Energy Corp.,11 7 the patent owner brought
an action for infringement of a patent covering an elevating catwalk used on
drilling rigs, to which the defendant asserted an affirmative defense of
invalidity. Seven months after the litigation commenced, the defendant filed a
a
petition for reexamination. The Patent Office found that the petition raised
11 8
substantial new question of patentability with regard to plaintiff's patent. In
the first office action, the Patent Office determined that each claim of the
patent-in-suit was invalid in view of the prior art submitted by defendant. The
defendant, thereupon, filed a motion to delay the trial (not yet scheduled)
pending the final office action, which was due within one month.119
The Loffland Bros. court granted the defendant's motion to stay the trial on
the merits until the final decision on the reexamined claims was available from
the Patent Office. 120 In doing so, the court acknowledged the advantages that
flow from the expert view of the patent examiner:
The technical expertise provided by the reexamination proceeding...
will be extremely helpful to this Court should further consideration of
this matter be necessary. Indeed, the Court invites a determination by
the [Patent Office] as to the validity of plaintiff's patent claims. The
reexamination procedure has the potential to eliminate trial on the
issue of patent infringement, should all of the patent's claims be
canceled.... In any event,12the expert view of the Patent Office will
certainly benefit this court. l

115 Freeman v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Del. 1987).
116

See Rosenthal Mfg. Co. v. Thermal Equip., Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12241, at *3

(D. Kan. 1988).
117225 U.S.P.Q. 886 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
118

1d.

119

1d. at 887.

120/d.
121

1d. at 886. See also Emhart Indus. Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
1888,1890 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("shifting the validity issue to the PTO has many advantages,
including... [a]ll prior art presented to the court will have been first considered by the
PTO, with its particular expertise"); In re Certain Cyrogenic Ultramicrotome Apparatus,
2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1790,1791 (U.S. Intl Trade Comm'n 1987) (stating that the Patent Office is
the lead government agency responsible for considering the validity of from which the
International Trade Commission would benefit from its determinations as to
patentability).
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In United Sweetener USA Inc. v. The Nutrasweet Co., 122 an accused infringer
brought an action against the patent owner, asking the court to declare the
latter's artificial sweetening agent patents invalid. 123 The plaintiff argued that
one of the two patents-in-suit was invalid for lack of novelty,12 4 asserting that
it was anticipated by prior art not considered in the initial Patent Office
examination. 125 Contemporaneously, the identified patent was under review
in a reexamination proceeding initiated by the challenger. 12 6 When the Patent
Office subsequently rejected the claims in the reexamination, the defendant
moved to stay all proceedings, including discovery, pending its appeal to the
Board of Patent Appeals. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the
defendant's motive was merely to delay the resolution of the case and that a
stay would unjustifiably exclude plaintiff and its customers from the
127
marketplace during the pendency of the reexamination.

The United Sweetener court, however, concluded that the equities among the
parties and the objectives of reexamination were best served by staying the
litigation pending the decision from the Board of Appeals.12 8 In reaching this
holding, the court recognized that Patent Office examiners and members of the
Board of Patent Appeals possess "a great deal of expertise and experience in
analyzing the merits of the petition for reexamination." 129 The court concluded
that such knowledge would promote certainty on the issue of validity and
render the ultimate resolution of the controversy more secure.130
The expertise factor, however, does not always redound to the advantage of
the party seeking to delay the litigation. This fact is illustrated in Minnesota
Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Freeman.13 1 In Freeman, the patent owner sued the
corporate defendants for infringement for the latter's unauthorized activity
associated with an intraocular lens device. Two years into the consolidated
122766 F. Supp. 212 (D. Del. 1991).
1231d. at 213.
124

See supra note 6 and accompanying text for discussion of novelty as a condition for
obtaining a patent.
12 5
United Sweetner, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nutrasweet, Co., 766 F. Supp. 212, 215 (D. Del.
1991).
12 6Id.
12 7
128

1d. at 216.
1d. at 217. Note, however, that the court limited the stay to the pending appeal in

order to prevent the defendant-patent owner from gaining any "unfair tactical
advantage" that might otherwise accrue. Id. at 218-19.
129
d. at 217; see also Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 530 F. Supp. 309,316 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) ("The major benefit of staying litigation pending reconsideration of a patent
under [reexamination] is that it affords the Court the assistance of the Patent Office's
specialized expertise on technical questions of validity").
130United Sweetner, 766 F. Supp. at 217.
131661 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1987).
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action, defendant 3M filed a petition for reexamination with the Patent Office
to, in part, resolve the question of whether certain documents constituted prior
art within the meaning of the statute.132 The precise issue for the court to decide
was whether the petition for reexamination should be enjoined in view of the
pending trial. 133 Because trial had not commenced and there was a possibility
that the court would benefit from the Patent Office determination, the court
134
declined to enjoin 3M from using the reexamination procedure.
The Freeman court, furthermore, went on to consider in dictum whether it
would be appropriate to stay its proceedings pending reexamination under the
circumstances. 135 While acknowledging that technical expertise is an
important factor to be considered in determining whether to suspend litigation
in this instance, the court observed that suspending litigation would not be
appropriate when reexamination is engaged merely to resolve a question that
is not of a highly technical nature. 136 The court thus reasoned that since
determining whether certain publications constitute prior art is not an overly
technical task, it would decide the issue without staying the litigation to await
the assistance of the Patent Office, despite the risk that the two might reach
137
different conclusions.
B. Likely Effect of Stay on Litigation
Courts also consider the likely effect that a stay pending reexamination
would have on the litigation as a whole. If the stay would more likely than not
delay the district court proceedings without any countervailing benefit, the
court will proceed with the merits of the case without the benefit of the Patent
Office reexamination opinion. 138 Similarly, if granting a stay would simply
award one party an unfair tactical advantage over the other parties, a court will

13 2

See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.

13 3

Freeman, 661 F. Supp. at 887.

13 4

d. at 888. The court cited MPEP, supra note 34, at § 2286 for the proposition that a
reexamination procedure will not be stayed due to ongoing litigation unless the action
is in the trial stage. Seealso Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594,607 (Fed Cir. 1985)
(MPEP § 2286 is not "a derogation of the statutory purpose nor an undue extension of
statutory authority"), nodified, reh'g denied, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
13 5

1t is, indeed, likely that the court was preempting an anticipated motion by the
defendants to stay the litigation pending conclusion of the reexamination procedure.
136
137

Freenan,661 F. Supp. at 888.

1d. at 888.

138

See, e.g., The Toro Co. v. L. R. Nelson Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. 636, 638 (C.D. Ill. 1984)
(denying motion to stay 3.5 year old case with pending summary judgment motion
because "granting the stay order accomplish little, other than the delay of disposition of
a suit....").
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favor preventing such an outcome.13 9 If, however, the probable net effect of
granting a motion to stay is to resolve technical claim questions 140 to narrow
the trial issues, 14 1 or to promote settlement, 142 the court will likely suspend the
litigation pending reexamination. Indeed, some courts presume such an effect
flows from reexamination and will delay trial on the merits in the absence of
143
an egregious delay in engaging the administrative procedure.
144
In Emhart Indus. Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd.,
the owner of a patent
covering a cam operated program timer brought an infringement action,
seeking damages. One year into discovery, related patents were disclosed that
both antedated the plaintiff's allegedly infringed patent and had not been cited
to the Patent Office during the original examination. 14 5 The accused infringer,
thereupon, filed a petition for reexamination with the Patent Office, asserting
that the unearthed patents raised a substantial new question of patentability.
Three months later the request for reexamination was granted, and the
defendant moved the court to stay the litigation.146
The Emhart Indus. court found the defendant's position to be meritorious and
147
ordered a stay of the proceedings pending conclusion of the reexamination.
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that
reexamination would not solve anything with finality because it lacked a
binding effect. The court explained:
A reexamination proceeding may result in the final cancellation of
claims from the patent.... Of course, the patent owner may appeal the
PTO's decision to the Board of Appeals and then to the Court of

13 9

See, e.g., Wayne Automation Corp. v. R. A. Pearson Co., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718, 1720
(E.D. Wash. 1991);E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 711 F. Supp.
1205, 1208 n. 9 (D. Del. 1989).
140
Robert H. Harris Co., Inc. v. Metal Mfg. Co. Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1789 (E.D.
Ark. 1991); see also supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. But see Enprotech Corp. v.
Autotech Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1319, 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1990).

141 See, e.g., United Sweetener USA Inc. v. The Nutrasweet Co., 766 F. Supp. 212, 217
(D. Del. 1991).
142See, e.g., Emhart Indus. Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1888,1890
(N.D. Ill. 1987); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 530 F. Supp. 309, 316 (N.D. Tex.
1981) ("The outcome of reexamination ... may encourage settlement thereby alleviating
the need from further judicial proceedings").
143

See GPAC Inc. v. D.W.W. Enter. Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1129, 1133-34 (D. N.J. 1992)
(nineteen month delay not egregious); Grayling Indus. v. GPAC Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872,
1874 (N.D. GA. 1991) (twenty-two month delay not egregious); see also Robert H. Harris
Co. v. Metal Mfg. Co., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1789 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
1443 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
145

1d. at 1890.

14

6/d.
1471d. at 1892.
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit.... Clearly, however, the end result of
reduce the
the reexamination will
148 be to simplify the issues and
complexity of the trial.
In the final analysis, the plaintiff's argument was turned on its head because
149
defendant had agreed to be bound by the determination of the Patent Office.
In Wayne Automation Corp. v. R. A. Pearson Co.,150 plaintiff alleged
infringement of a patent relating to delivery of collapsed dividers or partitions
from a storage magazine in a packaging machine. Several months before
discovery was to come to a close, but after a trial date was set, plaintiff filed a
petition for reexamination and sought to stay the district court proceedings. 15 1
In the face of the plaintiff's argument that a stay would efficiently resolve the
validity issue, the defendant asserted that granting the motion would unfairly
aggravate the chilling effect that the litigation already had in the
152
marketplace.
The Wayne Automation court agreed with the defendant and, hence, refused
to delay the trial on the merits. The court concluded that equity would not
accrue if the court allowed plaintiff to institute the action, notify the industry
of potential infringement, file a petition for reexamination, and then enjoy a
stay of the proceedings.153 In doing so, the court stated:
More compelling is [the] contention that the reexamination will not
resolve everything. If the claims were canceled it might end it all ....
But if any of the claims survived we would be right back here to litigate
1 4
the claim that the claim that the patent should not be enforced.

148 Id. at 1892. Compare this explanation of the efficiencies of reexamination with the
one offered in Grayling Indus. v. GPAC Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872 (N.D. Ga. 1991). There
the court observed:
On the one hand, if the patents are declared unpatentable, this action
would be moot. On the other hand, even though [the alleged infringer]
has not agreed to be bound by a PTO finding of a valid patent, such
finding would be admissible and carries a presumption of validity.
Moreover, the arguments which [the alleged infringers] would make
at trial will have been explicitly reviewed and rejected by the PTO,
adding to the persuasiveness of the PTO determination.
Id. at 1874.
149 Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1988, 1892 (N.D.
Ill. 1987).

15020 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
1SlId.
152

1d. at 1718.

3

15 Id. at 1720.
154

1d. at 1720 (quoting Enprotech Corp. v. Autotech Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1319, 1320
(N.D. Ill. 1990)).
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Although the degree to which this notion weighed in the court's calculus is
uncertain, it does reflect one perspective of the likely effect of reexamination
on litigation. 155 This viewpoint, however, is less compelling when the
enforceability of the patent depends exclusively on issues to be resolved in
156
reexamination.
C. Stage of Litigation at Which Requested
Courts also consider the stage of the litigation at which a motion to stay is
requested as one factor in evaluating the motion. If the motion is filed during
an early stage of the litigation, a court will be more inclined to suspend its
proceedings and await the results of the reexamination proceeding. 157 If, by
contrast, the motion is submitted at a point in the litigation before which
significant discovery or trial preparation has taken place, the court will be
reluctant to grant the motion. 158
In Enprotech Corp. v. Autotech Corp.,159 an accused infringer brought a
declaratory judgment action, asserting that defendant's patents relating to a
resolver (which detects the position of a rotating shaft) and associated decoding
electronics were invalid and not infringed by its product. When discovery was

155 Cf. supra note 148 and accompanying text.
156

See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.

157

purolite Int'l Ltd. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1857, 1858 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(granting stay several months into discovery but before scheduling order issued and
trial date set); Robert H. Harris Co. Inc. v. Metal Mfg. Co. Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1789
(E.D. Ark. 1991) (granting stay when suit pending for less than one year, little discovery
or trial preparation had occurred although trial date set); United Sweetener USA Inc. v.
Nutrasweet Co., 766 F. Supp. 212, 217 (D. Del. 1991) (granting stay when limited
discovery had occurred and reexamination in advanced stage).
158 Output Technology Corp. v. Dataproducts Corp., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072, 1074 (W.D.
Wash. 1991) (denying stay when significant discovery had occurred and trial date set);
Wayne Automation Corp. v. R. A. Pearson Co. 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718, 1720 (E. D. Wash.
1991) (denying stay when non-moving party had conducted extensive discovery and
case set for trial); Enprotech Corp. v. Autotech Corp. 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1319, 1320 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (denying stay when discovery nearly complete and case set for trial); E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 711 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D. Del. 1989)
(denying stay when litigation had advanced through trial, appeal, and remand);
Freeman v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886,888 (D. Del. 1987) (denying
stay when discovery had concluded, trial date was set, and the first of two consolidated
actions filed two and one-half years previous); The Toro Co. v. L. R. Nelson Corp., 223
U.S.P.Q. 636,638 (C.D Ill. 1984) (denying stay when suit had been pending for three and
one-half years). But see Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(granting stay five years into litigation and twenty days before trial), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 935, (1983); Emhart Indus. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889, 1890 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (granting stay eighteen months into litigation, significant discovery had occurred,
and trial date set); Loffland Bros. Co. v. MidWestern Energy Corp., 225 U.S.P.Q. 886,
887 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (granting stay after significant discovery, pretrial conference and
trial date set).
15915 U.S.P.Q.2d 1319 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
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nearly completed and a trial date had been established, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint which charged the patent owner with inequitable conduct
for failing to disclose a material reference during the initial examination. The
defendant responded immediately by filing a motion to stay in order to allow
it to pursue reexamination that would consider the same reference.
The Enprotech court, however, denied the motion because, in its view, the
litigation had proceeded "too far along the road to justify halting the journey
while the defendant explores an alternate route. '1 60 The court relied on two
important facts in arriving at its decision not to suspend the litigation. First,
the court recognized that even if the reexamination request was granted by the
Patent Office, the parties would still need to litigate the inequitable conduct
claim. 161 Second, and more important, was the fact that the litigation had
reached a stage at which discovery was nearly finished and the case was set for
16 2
trial.
In Robert H. HarrisCo. Inc. v. Metal Mfg. Co. Inc., 163 the patent owner brought
an infringement action, alleging that the defendant manufactured and sold a
product that violated its patent rights. After some pre-trial discovery had been
conducted, the accused infringer filed a petition for reexamination based on a
document recently discovered that, in its judgment, raised new questions of
patentability with respect to several claims of the plaintiff's patent. The
defendant subsequently filed a motion to stay the litigation pending the
reexamination, which was opposed by the patent owner on the ground that a
164
stay would serve merely to unjustifiably prolong litigation.
The Robert Harriscourt, however, disagreed with plaintiff's contention and
granted the motion to stay. At the outset, the court acknowledged the plurality
of advantages that accrue from the use of the reexamination proceeding 165 as
160

1d. at 1319-20.

16 1

See supra note 40.

62

1 Enprotech, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1320.
16319 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
164

1d. at 1789.

16 5

The enumerated advantages are as follows:

1. All prior art presented to the Court will have been first considered
by the [Patent Office], with its particular expertise.
2. Many discovery problems relating to prior art can be alleviated by
the [Patent Office] examination.
3. In those cases resulting in effective invalidity of the patent, the suit
will likely be dismissed.
4. The outcome of the reexamination may encourage a settlement
without the further use of the Court.
5. The record of reexamination would likely be entered at trial, thereby
reducing the complexity and length of the litigation.
6. Issues, defenses, and evidence will be more easily limited in pretrial
conferences after a reexamination.
7. The cost will likely be reduced both for the party and the Court.
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well as the congressional intent that district courts liberally grant stays. In
concluding that these expectations should not be forsaken under the
circumstances, it observed:
The Court has weighed the costs and benefits [of ordering a stay]. This
action has been pending for less than a year. Although it is set for trial
next month, this court is not persuaded that this is a case which has
run an overly protracted course .... The parties appear not to have
engaged in expensive discovery or expensive pretrial preparation.
Furthermore, ... [t]he Court is not persuaded that defendant has
process in an attempt to delay trial
abused the reexamination
66
proceedings.
of the
In light of these facts, the court ordered a stay pending the completion
167
reexamination or a negative determination on the threshold question.
D. Adequacy of Non-Movant's Legal Remedy
Courts also consider the adequacy of the patent owner's legal remedy as one
168
When the action is
factor in determining whether to suspend the litigation.
one for infringement and the accused infringer moves to stay the litigation
pending reexamination of plaintiff's patent, the court will more likely grant the
motion when the plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy, namely money
damages. 169 Thus, as a practical matter, the patent owner may be required to

Id. at 1789 (citing Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889, 1890 (N.D.
Ill. 1987)).
16 6 Robert H. Harris Co., Inc. v. Metal Mfg. Co., Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1789 (E.D.
Ark. 1991).
167

1d. See also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.

68

1 This, of course assumes, that the posture of the case is such that the accused
infringer has sought to stay the litigation in order to pursue reexamination and that the
patent owner opposes the motion. But, it is not uncommon for thepatent owner to pursue
reexamination during litigation as an alternative means to resolve the validity dispute.
See, e.g., Wayne Automation Corp. v. R.A. Pearson Co., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718 (E.D. Wash.
1991). In this instance, however, it is incongruous for the court to consider the adequacy
of the accused infringer's remedy at law.
169

Robert H. Harris Co., Inc. v. Metal Mfg. Co., Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1789 (E.D.
Ark. 1991) (granting stay when damages held adequate to compensate plaintiff-patent
owner); Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (same); Ingro v. Tyco Indus., Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. 69,70 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (same); Digital
Magnetic Sys., Inc. v. Ansley, 213 U.S.P.Q. 290 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (same).
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seek, and establish entitlement to, injunctive relief 170 in order to cut off an
171
alleged infringer's ability to delay disposition of the merits.
Even assuming, however, that the patent owner cannot satisfy the
prerequisites for injunctive relief, the accused infringer does not enjoy a right
to stay the litigation pending reexamination as a matter of course, as is
illustrated in Output TechnologyCorp.v. DataproductsCorp.172 This case involved
an infringement action for damages, brought by the owner of a patent covering
a dot matrix printer. After significant discovery had occurred and a trial date
had been established, the accused infringer filed a motion to suspend the
litigation pending a decision from the Patent Office on a reexamination petition
filed earlier. The plaintiff objected to such a stay, arguing that, as a small
business, it would suffer irreparable injury if the litigation were delayed. 173
The court accepted the patent owner's argument and refused to stay the
litigation. It held that when the non-movant has made a prima facie showing
of hardship, the party requesting a stay has the burden of going forward to
establish that the balance of hardships under the circumstances are in its
favor.174 Under this standard, the Output Technology court concluded that,
given the late stage of the litigation at which the petition was filed and the want
of countervailing factors favoring defendant's position, the motion should be
denied. 175
V. THE GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A STAY WILL
BE GRANTED: A REPRISE

In deciding whether to stay litigation over the validity of a patent pending
the outcome of a reexamination proceeding, courts necessarily engage in
balancing a host of equitable considerations. 176 They do so in an effort to reach
a conclusion that best serves the public policies of efficient dispute resolution
and maintaining a reliable patent system, while preventing one party from

17 0

Four factors will be considered in determining whether an injunction is
appropriate: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm;
(3) the balance of hardships; and (4) the public interest. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp.
v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
171
See Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889,1891 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) (granting stay in action for damages when patent owner alleged no adequate
legal remedy but did not seek injunctive relief).
17222 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
173

1d. at 1074.

174
Note that this burden could apply as well when the moving party is the patent
owner, provided due regard is afforded to the policy underlying the reexamination
statute.

175Output Technology, 22 U.S.P.Q. 24 at 1074.
176 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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gaining an unfair advantage in the litigation over the opposition. 1 77 From
canvassing the case law, no one factor emerges that is dispositive of the ultimate
question. Rather, courts make that determination on a case-by-case basis by
reference to the salient concerns and their relative magnitude. Generally, these
concerns can be distilled down to the following criteria:
First, will reexamination dispose of an issue that is technical in nature and
not ordinarily performed by the tribunal? If this can be answered in the
affirmative, the court will be inclined to grant a stay and transfer the matter to
the Patent Office where experts can address the question, provided other
countervailing considerations are not weighty.178 In the absence of an unjust
impact on one party or an adverse effect on the litigation, such a decision would
be warranted because the Patent Office is institutionally better situated to
efficiently resolve patentability questions and to inspire confidence in the
179
ultimate validity determination.
By contrast, where reexamination will involve a non-technical issue or where
a similar reexamination of the patent-in-suit has already been conducted, a
court will likely favor proceeding with the litigation without the assistance of
the Patent Office. 180 This result would not be inconsistent with the legislative
goals of the patent laws because the cost of resolving the issues increases
without enhancing confidence in the reexamined patent. 181
Second, will awaiting the Patent Office record likely simplify or dispose of
issues before the court, facilitate discovery for trial, reduce the overall cost of
litigation, or encourage settlement? If so, the court will be hard pressed to deny
the motion. 182 Under these circumstances, the objectives of efficiency and
reliability of the ultimate resolution of the validity question will again be
substantially advanced. A court thus would properly grant a motion to stay
pending the conclusion of reexamination, absent some other detrimental and
unjustifiable impact upon the litigation or one of the parties.183
If, however, the reexamination would not facilitate resolution of the
controversy because it would not address a substantial share of the issues at
trial, the court will favor proceeding with the litigation. Again, this would not
contravene the legislative mandate because efficiency gains from
reexamination would be speculative while the result would be unstable at best
in view of the open questions to be decided at trial. 184

177

See supra notes 19, 139 and accompanying text.

178

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.

79

1 See supra text accompanying note 29.
180

See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.

181

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

182

See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.

183

See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.

18 4

See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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Third, has the motion to stay been filed at an early stage of the litigation and
prior to the scheduling of trial? If this question can be answered in the
affirmative, the court will be inclined to rule in favor of the moving party.185 A
request at a point late in the litigation may undermine the efficiency objective
to an extent that, together with any adverse affect on one litigant, it is not
outweighed by the concomitant certainty that emerges with a reexamined
patent.
Finally, does the non-movant have an adequate remedy at law? If so, this fact
militates in favor of staying the proceedings pending reexamination because
186
monetary relief is capable of restoring the nonmovant to the status quo ante.
Assuming other considerations suggest that, under the circumstances,
reexamination would advance the goals that Congress envisaged, 18 7 this result
would not disturb the balance.
It is thus important in resolving the subject issue to view the question
through the lens that emphasizes the reexamination objectives of fostering
confidence in the validity of issued patents, resolving validity issues efficiently,
and maintaining a level playing field. As such, I would like to submit the
following standard by which courts may decide whether to grant a motion to
stay litigation pending reexamination: a stay of litigation should be granted
unless (1) the issues to be resolved in the Patent Office are not of a technical
nature; or (2) the benefits of efficient and reliable claim validity resolution are
substantially outweighed by the burdens associated with delay and unfair
prejudice to the non-moving party.
VI. CONCLUSION

Patent reexamination provides a substitute forum in which the validity of
an issued patent can be tested. One advantage that this procedure has over
litigation is that it is conducted by the Patent Office examiners who are experts
in the field of determining patent validity. Another advantage is that the
procedure is more economical than litigating the issue in federal court because
the cost to the litigants and society is substantially less.
Where the validity of a patent is an issue raised in federal court by way of a
patent infringement suit or action for declaratory judgment, one party may
seek to use the reexamination procedure and stay the litigation as a means by
which to resolve the controversy. A court petitioned to stay the litigation
pending the outcome of the Patent Office procedure will proceed in making its
determination based on principles of equity in view of the particular
circumstances of the case. It will balance the hardships that will result from
giving effect to the request and reach its ultimate conclusion by considering the
interests associated with the litigants, the court, and the legislative mandate.
In accomplishing this task, the court will observe the guidelines, as delineated
185 See supranote 157 and accompanying text.
186

See supranotes

187

See supranotes 174-75 and accompanying text.

168-69 and accompanying text.
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343

by Congress and prior judicial action, that advance a coherent and uniform
approach to the issue that other tribunals may follow.
Congress intended that courts would liberally administer a stay of court
proceedings when the goals of reexamination can be advanced. Reexamination
was not, however, perceived to be an instrument by which a litigant could
obstruct the resolution of the dispute. Judicial regard to discernible governing
standards can facilitate the legislative mandate and preserve the credibility of
the process.
STEVEN M. AuvIL
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